Authentication between mobile devices in ad-hoc computing environments is a challenging problem. Without pre-shared knowledge, existing applications rely on additional communication methods, such as out-of-band or location-limited channels for device authentication. However, no formal analysis has been conducted to determine whether out-of-band channels are actually necessary. We answer this question through formal analysis, and use BAN logic to show that device authentication using a single channel is not possible.
INTRODUCTION
One core component of ubiquitous computing is communication with other devices, which usually occurs using broadcast radio frequency (RF) transmission. A challenge for this type of communication is device authentication, which means ensuring that only the intended devices are those actually communicating. This is especially difficult because devices in ubiquitous computing are not assumed to possess a priori knowledge of each other.
In standard computing environments, authentication protocols are subject to rigorous performance analysis and verification. One tool for doing this is known as BAN Logic [2] . However, applying such formal analysis to device authentication protocols in mobile computing applications has not been studied to date. Important and interesting questions arise such as: are location-limited channels a necessary component of device authentication between mobile devices in ubiquitous computing? We seek to answer this question. Specifically, we show that device authentication between previously unknown devices in ubiquitous computing is not possible using only a single broadcast channel for communication. * Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.
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BACKGROUND
Mobile computing environments generally do not assume the presence of a trusted authority (TA) to provide verified authentication information, such as public keys. One technique for verifying key establishment between mobile devices is proposed by [1] and introduces the concept of location-limited channels (LLCs),which are are a means of communication between two devices with the property that the operators of the devices have control over which devices are communicating.
We can turn to formal methods as a tool in evaluating the soundness of proposed authentication protocols, such as one approach called "BAN Logic" [2] . This work presented a logic of belief, which is basically the process of coupling assumptions about current states with a simple set of steps and reasoning, to arrive at a conclusion regarding the soundness of an authentication protocol. It has been used extensively to identify flaws in new and existing security protocols, and is often employed by authors to prove new proposals sound. Please refer to [2] for a complete description of BAN Logic constructs and postulates.
OUR APPROACH
First, we must establish the conditions by which the problem of device authentication in ubiquitous computing is bound. We assume the only channel of communication is a wireless broadcast channel (RF), available to all devices, including those of an attacker. We assume no a priori knowledge exists between the two devices wishing to communicate securely. Furthermore, we assume the existence of an active attacker, who is able to intercept and modify the contents of RF transmissions between our two devices -this is commonly referred to as the "man in the middle."
We will use BAN logic to analyze a basic question: is device authentication possible without the use of a sidechannel (LLC, human interaction, etc.)? In considering this question, we make the following claim: If a protocol exists that allows device authentication without use of LLCs (i.e. using RF communication only), then it can be verified to be correct using BAN logic.
Analyzing Authentication Between Unknown Mobile Devices
Let us consider the following definitions regarding our environment and goals: Proof. We will prove this proposition by contradiction. To do so, we will assume that there is a protocol for device authentication between two previously unknown devices in an ad-hoc environment that does not use additional information, such as that provided by a demonstrative side-channel, and attempt to prove this assumption correct.
Let us first establish the goals of device authentication. The goals of authentication, according to [2] , can vary, but generally consist of a shared session key between two entities:
Because we assume no a priori knowledge between devices, the shared key A K ← → B must be established via the authentication protocol between A and B, it cannot be assumed to exist beforehand. There are two possible cases for authentication protocols that are key-based: those that use symmetric keys and those that use asymmetric keys.
Case 1: Symmetric Keys.
Device authentication protocols using symmetric keys, by the very definition of symmetric keys, assume that information is already shared between both devices -specifically a shared symmetric key. It is trivial to show, because this violates the constraints we have established for key-based device authentication in mobile computing, that this family of protocols is not possible.
Case 2: Asymmetric Keys.
For device authentication protocols utilizing asymmetric keys, it is required that each device know the public key of the other device. Doing so requires that each device, at some point during the mutual device authentication protocol, receives the public key of the other device. To put it formally, at some point, the following must occur:
However, simply receiving a public key does not assure a device that it is the authentic public key of the intended target device. Therefore, the goal in this protocol is more stringent, specifically, it is assurance the public key of the sending device is authentic, or to put it formally:
Note that both components are required for mutual device authentication to occur. We will therefore begin with an analysis of the first component, A| ≡
Case 2.1: Authenticating
Typically, when proving a protocol using BAN logic, assumptions are established first. We assume the following for our hypothetical device authentication algorithm:
Working backwards from our goal, by the jurisdiction rule, we see that for A | ≡ K b → B to be true, we must establish
that is, B has control of its own public key. To establish the second part of this rule,
Considering our assumptions, we see that only A | ≡ ♯( 
Final Steps.
By analyzing the necessary steps for key-based device authentication protocols between two previously unknown mobile devices, we have demonstrated that such protocols under the constraints of ad-hoc computing are not possible using only a single broadcast channel. Because our example is representative of any key-based device authentication protocol operating under the constraints of ad-hoc computing, and we have shown that such an protocol is not possible, we have successfully proven our proposition.
